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ExTRAORDINARY ANGUISH - THE TRAMPLING OF RIGHTS
AMIDST CONFLICT

IN SRI

LANKA

- Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena

INTRODUCTION - Denial of the Concept of Legal Accountability and
the Rule of Law
For decades. the basic conception of the legitimacy of the law needed for enforcing
accoumabiliry on the Sri Lankan State has been severely undermined by a persistent
political rationale that has unequivocally rejected the notion oflegal accountabiliry.
both during emergency as well as during periods of relatively normal functioning.
While ad hoc and emergency powers of state agents have often extended beyond
a=ptable notms. the frameworkofaccountabiliry (investigative. prosecutorial and
legal) has remained stubbornly pre-colonial and wholly unable to deal with endemic
patterns of abuse of power. Advanced concepts. such as 'command responsibiliry'
and 'victims' participation in the trial process' that have come to be accepted as
sine qua non by justice systems dealing with abuses during times of war, are still
completely alien to the domestic legal system.
Two youth insurrections in the South and the recently concluded conflict in
the North/Eas t have provided easy justifications for successive governments to
maintain that a state of emergency is absolutely necessary for dealing with threats
to the State. In the post-independence years. emergency laws have restricted
the right to life and personal liberties and the right to conduct public meetings.
apart ftom imposing severe press censorship and curtailing the rights to assembly
and forming of associations such as trade unions. Framed within a pervasive
culture of impuniry for state agents. who commit violations under cover of
the emergency regime. the resultant impact of such terror and counter-terror
on thousands of Sinhalese. Tamils and Muslims has been great. In particular.
enforced disappearances of individuals have been a persistent phenomenon.
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T hus. the imbalance between powers exercised by the State on the one hand. and
the absence oflegal accountabiliry on the other. has resulted in a profound failure
in securing victim-friendly justice in Sri Lanka. There has been conscienceless
political subversion of constitutional mechanisms established ro resrore public
confidence in the independence of key moniroring bodies such as the National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC). the National Police Commission (NPC)
and the Judicial Service Commission aSC).' When such manifest contempt
for the Constitution is exhibited by political rulers. how can the country
place any faith in the relevance of the rule of law ro their lives? How can the
people continue to have confidence in legal and prosecurorial processes in
respect of even ordinary violations of human rights. leave aside extraordinary
violations such as enforced disappearances? On an emi nently practical
level moreover. the capaciry of the NHRC and the NPC (who should have
played a vital role in preventing gross human rights violations in the current
intensification of the conRict) to deal with their constitutional and staturory
mandates has been diminished by the members lacking constitutional validiry
in their appointments .
From an allied perspective. there has been increased conservation of judges in
recent times (excepting in a few isolated cases). coupled WIth the rejection of
international standards of rights protection that had been once fairly consistently
The 17th Amendment of the Constitution, passed unanimously in Parliament in 200 1,
3ncmprcd to redress a heavily politiciscd process of appointme ts to important pOSts
in the public service, including that of the Inspector General o f Police. the Attorney
General and the Chief Justice, as well as a number of constitution,lI commi ss ions. It was
mandated that the appointments be made by the Presidem but subject to the no minations
being approved by a ten membe r Constitutional Council (ee) consisting o f eminent
non political public personalities as well as political leaders from the government and the

opposition. The CC functioned for only its term and was unable [0 sct up the new Elections
Commission due [0 inability to agree with then President Chandrika Kumartunge on the
choice of ics Chairman. In 2006, the CC became wholly non-funnional due to a virtual
political conspiracy between members of the smaller political pa nies refusing [0 agree
on one remain ing nomination (Q the CC and President Mahinda Rajapakse refusing (Q
make the appointmencs of the nominations already sem [0 him, u til this one remaining
member was also nominated. A strong argument by constitutional experts that the quorum
of the CC was already satisfied and the spirit of the constitutional amendment ought to
be adhered to by bringing the CC into being was ignored by Pre:;ident Rajapakse who
thereafter made his own appointments. consisting, for the main pan, of personal friends
and politicalloyaliscs who had little human rights understanding in the community.
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incorporated into domestic law as part of a liberal jurisprudence on rights by
their judicial predecessors, and the erosion of the independence of Sri Lanka's
Judiciary.' This has resulted in the negation of even the small victOries that
were won earlier in the name of justice, and the turning away of victims from
formal mechanisms of legal accountabiliry, which have failed, by and large,
to give them justice. In rum, this has created a vacuum of public confidence
in institutions meant to ptotect the rule of law and aggravated a dangerously
implosive sense of individual and collective isolation.
Keeping these preliminary reflections in mind, this paper analyses the response
of Sri Lanka's legal system to the recognition of the right to life, and the crime
of enforced disappearances, within the general context of national law and
international standards. It examines the climate of emergency law that has
made grievous human righ ts violations possible and the nature as well as the
validiry of judicial responses to the same. It uses specific cases to illustrate overall
deficiencies in the relevant legal framework as well as prosecutorial policy, to
make the point that the common factor in relation to all these processes has been
the inabiliry to offer reconciliation for victims. The absence of a constructively
interlinking relationship between the law/formal legal bodies and commissions
of inquiry is singular in this regard.
The paper stressed the point that the failure of legal!judicial! prosecutorial
processes has been evidenced nOt only in relation to extraordinary crimes
committed when emergency law was in force, but also in relation to the
normal maintenance oflaw and order. For example, the often insurmountable
difficulties which victims of torture experience in securing justice during
the periods when there was no conflict, have much in common with the
trauma of those who had involuntarily disappeared during times of internal
conflict. Understanding the comprehensive and continuing failure of legal

2

See repo ft by the United Nations special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judi ciary

in April 2003 to the UN Commission on Human Rights , (E/CN.4 /2003/65/Add. 1 25.
February 2003) and among several relevant press releases of th e Special Rapporteur, see
releases dated 27 February 2003 an d 28 May 2003. See also Sri Lanka: Failing to protect
the Ruk of Uzw and tht Intkpendence of tht Judiciary Report of the International Bar
Association (2001 )."
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and prosecutorial policy in both contexts is fundament in tryi ng to secure
justice, truth seeking, reparations, digniry fo t victims, refo rm and deterrence
in a manner that goes beyond isolated legal triumphs.

SRI LANKA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ORDINARY AND
EXTRAORDINARY LAWS
The following analysis outlines the manner in which a well developed statutory
regime that priotitized the rights of individuals gradually became supplanted by
an emergency regime against which the Constitutions and, indeed , the cou rts
became virtually helpless. The impact of these emergency laws was, in fact,
not confined to the period within which an actual state of emergency was in
force. Instead, as this paper will detail , decades of unbridled powers resulted in
state agents and, particularly, the pol ice resorting to such powers even during
periods of relatively normal functioning when the emergenLY had been revoked
and the ordinary law was in force .
This discussion is important in order to trace the inexorable creation of a
culrure of imp unity, resu lting in persistent p atterns o f en for ce d
di sappearances, as well as to comprehend the narure and extent of the
resistance that will be inevitable in regard to proposed refo rm of the law and
prosecutoriaillegal policies in this regard.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW
The prevalent 1978 Constirution guarantees a number of basic rights and
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to hea r an d determine
comp lai nts of infringements of those ri ghts by executi ve or administrative
action J In particular, the ri ght to freedom from arbitrarv arrest, detention

3

The ex isting consri[mionai provisions arc problemati c in many respects . Judic ial or
legislative acts are not challengeable. In addition , enacted laws cannot be chall enged
o n gro unds of thei r unco nsticutionaiiry in terms of Art. 16(1 ) of the CON STI TUTI ON OF
SRILANKA. InStead (vid, Art. 121 of the CONSTtTUTION) bills muSt be challenged within

one week of their being placed on the Order Paper of Parliamem. Though there is a
consriwci onai requirement to publi sh the bills in the gazett e at least seven days before
it is placed on [he Ord er Paper of Parliament, (vide An. 78(1) of the CONSTITUTION)
public access to the gazcnc is extrcmely limited, making publ ic sc rutiny of bills difficult
if not imposs ible. Moreover, even this limited procedure could be completely bypassed by
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and punishment is secured by art. 13(1) and (2).' Though these have been
the most worked constitutional provisions, art. 13(4), which stipulates
inter alia, that 'no person shall be punished with death or imprisonment
except by order of a competent court, made in accordance with procedure
established by law,' has been innovatively used in recent years to bring in
a limited constitutional protection of the right ro life in the absence of a
specific constitutional right. This has had particular importance insofar as
the prohibition against enforced disappearances is concerned, as will be
discussed later on in this study.
Though these rights were made part of a 'justiciable" constitutional framework
only in 1978, they, in fact, reflected commonly accepted principles of protection
of the liberry of the citizen that had long been part of Sri Lanka's statutory law,
comprising the penal law as well as the codes of criminal ptocedure and evidence,
(basically modelled on the old British law) and painstakingly developed by the
country's judges since independence. Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure
Act, No 15 of 1979." incorporated accepted procedures in relation to arrest,

the Cabinet certification of a bill as being urgent in the national interest in which case,

(virk Art. 122 of the CONSTITUTtON), the bill is referred directly by the President of the
Supreme COUrt for a determination on the question of its consrilUtionaiiry.

4

Art. 13( 1)- no person shall be arrested except according (0 'procedure established by law.'
Any person arrested shall be inFormed of [he reason for the arresr. An. 13(2)- every person
held in custody, detained or mherwise deprived of personallibcrry shall be brou ht before
9
the judge of the nearCSt competent court according to 'procedure established law and shall
nm be funher held in custody, detained deprived of personalliberry except upon and in
terms of the order of such judge made in accordance with "procedure established by law. "
Art. 13 (3)· "any person charged with an offence shall be entitled to be heard in person
or by an attorney·at·law, at a fair trial by a competenr coun". Art. 11· "No person shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

5

Previously, the 1972 'autochthonous' Constitution included a number of fundamental
rights but did not vest exclusive jurisdicti on in the Supreme Coun in that respect
to determine whether the rights had been violated, thus resu lting in these not being
constitutionally 'justiciable' rights.

6

The previous 'autochthonous' Constitution. 1972, included a number of fundamental
rights but did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in that respect to
determine their violations. These rights were only enforceable in that appropriate relief
could be sought from the original or appellate CQuers. In actual fact, only one such case was
instituted in that regard. Among the rights thus incorporated was An. 18(C) stipulating
(hat 'no person shall be deprived of life. liberty or security of person except in accordance
with the law.'
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including the stipulation that the person making arrest must inform the arrestee
of the nature of the charge or allegation upon which the arrest is made? The
Evidence Ordinance precluded proof of three categories of confessions,' namely
confessions caused by an inducement, threat or promise; confessions made to a
police officer, a forest officer or an excise officer; and confessions made by any
person while in the custody of the abovementioned three categories of officers.'
Among the other relevant statutes in this context is the domestic legislation
enacted ro give effect ro the UN Convention against Torture,I O namely the
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment Act No 22 of 1994(hereafter the Torture Act) .11

7

S. 23(1 ). This provisio n of {he Code in practice today reRects ~imilar principles in (he
old Criminal Procedure Code to which it succeeded.

8

Evidence Ordinance. 55. 24.25 (1)a nd (2) and 26(1) and (2) respec,i vely.

9

The body of case law safeguarding perso nal liberties in this respect is formidable. For
example. the pri vilege against sclf·d crcrmination has been descl ibcd as "a fundamental
postulate in conformity with which both procedural and substantive laws need to be
interpreted. De Mel v. HanilTa (1952) 53 N LR 433 . This privilege is confined in irs

application to proceed ings [hac lakes place in a judicial forum but to accommodate within
its ambit the emire course of (he po lice inves tigation which precedes the form ing of the
charge or rhe presentation of the indictment. Deheregoda v. Nw is (191 3) 16 NLR, 233,
van Culenberg v. CalTor (1933) NLR 433. Further, the importance of prevention of the
conviction of an accused person from being furthered by statements made by himself

has been judicially acknowledged. R v. Buddharakkita (1916) 63 NLR 43. p. 47. Abuse
of authority by the police which cou ld erode the fundamental rights of the citizen had
been discouraged from early days. R v. Gnansheeha (1968) 73 NLR 154 at Page 180. R
v

Murugan Ramaswamy (1964) 66 NLR 265. at p. 268 . Much of this "'1Se law has now

become redundant due to the emergency laws exp li citly adm itting confess ions made to
police officers above a particular rank.
10

Sri Lanka is parry 1O the Convention against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel.
Degrading and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment ('CAT') on 3 Janu ary 1994. art. 4
of the Convent ion provides thar:

"(1) Each State Party shall cnsure that all acts of tOrture are offence~ under its cr irninallaw.
The same shall apply to an ancmp t to commit torture and to an .lct by any perso n which
constitutes complicity or paniciparion in tOrture.

(2)

Each State Party shall make these offences punishab le by appropr ate penalt ies which take
into account their grave nature."

11

S. 2 of the Act makes [Qrture, or the attempt to commit, or the aiding and abetting in
commining, or conspiring [Q co mmit torture, an offence. A person fou nd guilty after
trial by the High Coun is punishable with imprisonmcm for a tcrm nO( less than seven
years and not exceeding ten years, and a finc not less than Rs. 10 ,000 and not exceeding

Rs.50.000.
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EXTRAORDINARY LAWS
fu would be evidenced in the following analysis, the full weight of extraordinary
emergency laws have been felt for decades against Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims.
Their generalised use amidst a culture of impunity for abuses committed under
their cover led to a situation where using ethnicity as a specific ground fo r
oppression became a well-known phenomenon; explicit resorting by army soldiers
to sexual violence against Tamil women during the period of the conflict in the
N orth/East and the subjecting of individuals to unjustified searches and detention
purely on rhe grounds of ethnicity are two good examples. 12

The primary legal provisions rela ting ro public securi ty in Sri Lanka are
contained in the Public Security Ordinance (hereafrer the PSO ) N o 25 of1 947
(as amended) and in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Tempo rary Provisions)
Act No 48 of 1979 (as amended) (hereafre r rhe PTA) . These enactments were
supplemented from time to time by other ad hoc laws, as was the case in 1962
when special legislation was bro ught in ro try individuals impl icated in an
aborted coup, and in 1971 where, again, special measures were taken followin g
an armed insurrection by yo uth .
The PSO was passed by the State Council (Ceylon's legislative asse mbly as it
was then known) on the eve of the country's independence, in order to meet
threat of a general strike organized by leftist trade unions in 1974. Part III
was added to the PSO in 1959, giving special powers to the executive under
emergency to callout the armed forces who were given special powers of search
and arrest, as well as the seizure and removal of guns and explosives. Thereafter,
states of emergency were declared under cover of which, legitimate oppositio n
was curbed; an early instance of this occurred in 1961, when the government
in power sought to control the activities of the Federal Party in the North.

12

The lan ce point is w ell illustrated in one case where a long-term Tami l resident of Colombo
was arrested and d etained fo r failure to produce a document of registratio n at the rel evant
police station , des pite his pro testati o ns that he did nO( need to prod uce such a documcnr

as he has not co me to Colo mbo fro m outside. and he had his ide ntity ca rd with him at
all tim es. The arrest w as on (he basis that as he was of Tam il cr hnici ry, th e identity card
was not sufficient lO prove his bona fides . T he arrest, as well as detentio n, was ruled to
be unconstitutio nal by the Supreme Coun .
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The state of emergency (declared on the 17<h of April 1% I) continued. even
after agitation by the Tamil parties in the North had been controlled. and was
employed as a useful weapon ro suppress civic protests against harsh measures
introduced in the budget. 13
The first Republican Constitution of 1972 conferred power upon the Prime
Minister. acting within a Westminster system of gover ance. to advise the
President to declare the existence or the imminence of a state of public
emergency. In employing the PSO to deal with the insurgency of April 1971. 14
the right to conduct public meetings was restricted. p ress censorship was
imposed and rights to assembly and association of trade unions severely affected.
After the insurrections. some fourteen thousand people were arrested in the
most severe manifestation of emergency rule since independence. A special
commission (the Criminal Justice Commission set up through Act No.14 of
1972) tried the several thousands implicated in this insurrection. The Act's
departure from normal procedural safeguards in regard to personal liberties
was a precursor ro future even more draconian laws. such as the Prevention
ofTerrorism Act. 15 The trial of thousands of suspects under this extraordinary

13

The aborted coup of 27'" of January 1962 rook place not long thereaner. The alleged
conspirators of the coup were arrested and detained, and the invesrigatio ns carried
out under a state of emergency. during which the infamous Criminal Justice (Special
Provisions) Act was passed in both houses of Parliamem. This Act was then ruthlessly
used to quell all opposition to the government.

14

This first insurgency commenced famously when, in the early hours of April 5, 1971,
the Wellawaya police station was attacked and twO policemen killed . A restricted curfew
was imposed with effect from April 5. in certain districts. and an all island curfew was

imposed with effect from April 6. 1971 . On March 7. 1971, Part III of the Public Securiry
Ordinance (PSG) was brought into operation, enabling the PI ime Minister {Q call ou{
the armed forced under S. 12. On March 16. 197 1. parts I & II of the Public Securiry
Ordinance were invoked on the reco mmendations of the Prime Minister by the Governor
General, and a state of emergency was declared island wide. Eml:rgency rule commenced

on March 16. 1971 and lapsed in February 1977.
15

S. 11 mandated thac an inquiry before a Commission was held {Q be free from the
formalities and technicalities of the rules of procedure ordinarily appl icable to a court
oflaw. By S. 25, the finding made or sentence imposed by a Comm ission was final and
conclusive and not to be called in question "in any court or tribunal, whether by way of
action, application in revision, appeal, writ or otherwise." S. 11 permitted the introduction
in evidence, as subslantive evidence, of confessionary statemen made to police office rs
by suspects , initiating a highly problematic deparcure from {he prohibition of confessions
in s. 25 of the Evidence Ordinance.
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law (despite arguments that, though the law itself was draconian, the
commission established under it functioned with due legal propriety)
represents one of the most disrurbing moments in Sri Lanka's history.
The enactment of Second Republican Constitution in 1978 replaced the
Cabinet style of government with an executive Presidency, its incumbent
being directly elected by the people. The balance between the PSG, vis-avis constitutional safeguards against abuse of rights, was shifted slightly to
the positive inasmuch as specific Parliamentary control was stipulated over
a proclamation of emergency. 16 Insofar as the making of regulations were
concerned, presidential approval was prescribed. 17 Emergency regulations
(ERs) were mandated to prevail over other law,18 including particularly

16

THE P UBLIC SECURITY (AMENDMENT)

UW, No. G of 1978 sta ted that a Proclamation
of Emergency (bringing into operation part II of the Public Securiry Ordinance) will
be operative only for a period of one month and had to be passed in Parliament within
fourtee n days from the date on which provisions of part II comes into operation. Arl, J 55
of the 1978 CONSTITUTION required Parliamem to meet within 10 days of {he makin g of
a Proclamation and further required that such Proclamatio n be approved by a resolution
of Parliament. If such approval is nO[ given. the Proclamation shall lapse within 14 days.
A Proclamation will be in effect for 30 days. and no Proclamation made with in the next
30 days ensuing shall come imo operation until approved by a reso luti on of Parliamem.
Once 90 days emergency rule have passed. or there has been an aggregate of ninety days
emergency rule during any six momh period. then the approval must be by a [wo thirds
majority of Parliamem.

17

S. 2 of the PSO provided thar where. in view of the existence or imminence of a state of
emergency, the Pres idem is of the opinion that it is exped ient so to do in the interests of
public security and the preservation of public order or for the maintenance of supplies
and services esselllial to the life of the community, the President may by Proclamation
declare that Part II of the PSG shall come into operation. The President's opinion cannot
be called into question in any court. (PSO S. 3 and also Art. 154 J (2) of the 1978
CONSTITUTION). Once Part II of the PSG is in operation as aforesaid, lhe Presidenr is
empowered to make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient in the
interests of public security and [he preservation of public order and the suppression of
mutiny. riot or civil com mOl ion or for the maintenance of supplies and services essemial
to the life of the community.

18

See PSO. ss. 5, 7 and 8. ERs have legal effect of over-riding. amending or suspending the
operations of the provisions of any law. except the provisions of the Co nsti tution (Art.
155 (20). The fundamental rights specified in Chapter III of the 1978 CONSTITUTION
comprise the right to equality, freedom from arbilrary arrest and detention. freedom of
speech, assembly, association, occupation and movement, the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. freedom from torture). All but the last two rights can be restricted
by ER but cannot be taken away ahogeilier. Judicial intervention in rcstricting the ambit
of these regulations is discussed later in this study.
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the sa lutary provisions of the Criminal Procedure Cod(· and the Evidence
Ordinance which had earlier imposed strict prohibi tions on arbitrary
restraint of personal li berties. The PTA was used as a complementary
emergency law to the PSO from the seventies onwards its provlslOns tOO
reinforci ng the replacement of the ordinary law of the land by extensive
powers of arrest, search and detention. I?
From the 1990's onwards, the two major parties succeedin g each other
in gove rnment 20 resorted to emergency regulations sing the periodic
intensification of the conflict in the North/ East for this purpose. Holding
detainees incommunicado for unlimited period of time, many of whom
subsequently were 'disappeared' became common practice. Th ough their
substance varied from time to time, common features of these regulations
included the absence of any or minimum safeguards relating to conditions
of detention, including permitting incommunicado dete tion, admissibility
of police confess ions to senio r police officers, taking away of the judicial
discretio n relating to the granting of bail , and doing away with the normal
procedure in relation to deaths in custody in respect to the granting of bail,
and doing away with the normal procedure in relation to deaths in custody
in respect to inquestS, post-mortem examinations, disposal o f bodies and
jud icial inquiry.

19

This 'temporary' law was made permanen t in 1982. Among it s provisions inimical to
liberty rights, arc s. 6(1) , allowing arrest of any pe rson concerned in an d so on in any
unlawful activity, and s. 7 ( I), allowing detention up to seventy-(\', 0 hours w ith magisterial
scrutiny thereafter. Even this limited judicial supervision is not necessary if a ministerial
detention order is made under s. 9( 1) of the Act , which can be extended for a period not
exceeding three momhs at a time, up [0 eighteen months. These provisions have however,
been restricted by judicial interpretation as wou ld be discussed later on. The PTA also
makes admissible confessions to police offi cers above the rank of assistant su perintendents
and putS the burden of proving that these confessions are voluntary on the suspect.

20

VIZ: the Peoples' Alliance, consisting of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party with al lied leftist
parties and the United Nat ional Front with its core parry being the United N ational Parry
and coalition partners drawn mainly from minority political parties.
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PREVALENT EMERGENCY REGULATIONS21 REFLECT MANY OF
THESE DRACONIAN POWERS.
Judicial Responses to Abuse of Power by State Agents

During the late eighties and particularly from the nineties onwards, Sri Lanka's
Supreme Court responded spiritedly to the human rights dilemmas of persons
arbitrarily arrested and detained under emergency law, in terms of its exclusive
jurisdiction of protection of fundamental rights.
Strict rules of invocatio n of the jurisdiction of the court dictated that a
fundamental rights petition (wi th six copies and with the payment of court
fees) has to be filed mandatorily within one month of the violation becoming
known to the victim. However, the rules were relaxed in order to permit the
filing of petitions upon a simple appeal sent to the Registrar of the Court."
The authoriry in charge of every place of detention was judicially directed to
allow an Attorney-at-Law authorized by either association to have reasonable
access to detenus in order to obtain instructions, co swear affidavits, and to

prepare applications to court or representations to Advisory Committees; to
prepare and circulate a written statement describing the detainees' rights; and
to acknowledge receipt of their applications and representations, and to forward
them promptly to the addressee." Formal petitions were thereafter prepared
and submitted to court, regardless of the fact that the one month period had
been bypassed. Some five thousand petitions were inquired into by the Court
in this manner, and orders were issued to either bring the detainees to trial or
to release them in the absence of filing indictment."
21

Emagency (Misalia ntous Provisions and Powers) Regulation No.1 of 2005 in
Gazcne Extraordinary No. 1405/ 14 of l3, August 2005. as amended intern/in, by Gazettes
Extraordinary Nos. 1442116 of27 April 2006, 1448/21 of8 June 2006,1450/ 18 of21
June 2006, 1456/27 of3 August 2006,146218 of 12 September 2006,1414/22 of 13
October 2005 and 1464126 of29 September 2006. Many regulations continue not to
be known (0 the public due to inaccessibility of the relevam gazettes.

22

In Re Perera, SC 1/90: Supreme Court Minutcs ("SCM") 18.9.1990.

23

"Judicial Development of Human Rights: Some Sri Lankan Decisio ns" Justice MDH
Fernando, Sri Lanka Journal of International Law, Volume 16, 2004, Faculty of Law,
University of Colombo.

24

Ibid. it was pointed out by Justice Fernando that no statistics are available of the cases
disposed of during this period but that it is likely that over 10,000 detainees benefited.
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Substantively, the power of state agents to arrest and detai n under emergency
was significantly restricted by the Court, which asserted its power, interalia,
to strike down an emergency regulation when held to confer unguided and
unfettered discretion to the police or the forces. Judicial reasoning in this regard
was clear. While art. 15(7) of the Constitution gave the executive the power to
make emergency regulations restricting the right to free speech in the interes ts
of national security or public order, this provision was counterbalanced by art.
155(2) of the Constitution which placed a limitation on the President from
making regulations inconsistent with fundamental rights. Therefore, whatever
the regulations made by virtue of art. 15(7) must be intra vires regulations.
For a regulation to be intra vires, it must show a ptoxi mate or reasonable
connection between the nature of the action prohibited and the ground on
which it is prohibited (i.e. , any of the restrictions enumerated in art.s 15 (2)
& (7)) . Any indirect or farfetched connection between the twO would make
the regulation invalid's
Moreover, though the Court would give due weight to the opinion of the
President on whether a particular regulation was necessaty or not, it could claim
to itself the power to question the necessity of the regulation and whether the
required proximity exists. Thus, the "satisfaction" of the Secretaty on which
ground an order is issued for the detention of a person, must be objectively
proven, and must be reasonably established on actual malerial before him at
the time of making the impugned order.26
The Defence Secretaty was requ ired to do more than me rely plead national
security as reason for arrest under emergency. He had to place before the Court
material which would show that his decision to arrest and detain had been taken
on reasonable grounds. The person so arrested had to be told the reason for
the arrest, namely all the material and pertinent facts that went to make up the
mind of the official ordering the arrest and not merely to be told the object or
purpose of the arrest. Where an arrest was clearly unreasonable, the Court had

25
26

Joseph Perara v. The Attorney Ge neral (1992) I Sri LR 199. 230
Ibid.

Extraordinary Anguish - The Trampling of Rights Amidst Conflict In Sri Lanka

the authority to release the victim on the basis that there was lack of sufficient
material for the detention or that the Defence Secretary has misdirected himself
in law. Thus, the discretion given to the Defence Secretary was not unfettered.
It must be exercised reasonably, in good faith and on proper grounds.'7
Insofar as the PTA was concerned, some decisions of the Court were significant
in their impacr. 2B In particular, a rights plea filed by an officer of a law enforcing
arm of the State marked an unequivocal warning by the Court that provisions of
the PTA cannot be abused."lt was held that there was no reasonable suspicion
established of any unlawful activity on the part of the detainee and therefore his
arrest as well as his subsequent detention was unconstitutional. PTA Sections
7(1) authorising detention was ruled to apply only to a valid arrest made under
PTA Section 6(1). Where the arrest had been wrong, as was the case in this
instance, the condition imposed by art. 13(2) of the Constitution that the
arrestee be brought before a judge of the nearest competent court according to
procedure established by law, would apply. The subsequent detention in terms
of PTA Section 9(1) by ministerial order, ostensibly on the basis that there was
"reason to believe or suspect" that such person is concerned in unlawful activity,
was also ruled to be unconstitutional as the continued detention had been at
27

Out of the several such cases in this regard, see Shanrhi Chandrasekeram Y. D. B. Wijetunge
and others (1992) 2 Sri Lanka L.R. 293, Subhash Chandra Fernando v. Kapilaratne
(1992) I Sri L.R. 305, Channa Pciries v AG (1994) I SLR at p 5 land particularly, Sunil
Rodrigo v. De Silva (1997) 3 SLR 265. The latter case is authority for the right of a
detainee under emergency to be produced before a magistrate and for a detainee to have
legal representation.

28

In one early case, Senhilanayagam and other v. Seneviratne and another (1981) 2 SLR
187, the Court directed that (he detenus who were being detained under (he PTA should
have access to their lawyers. This was in the context of the PTA making no provision for
access to a lawyer soon after arrest. Indeed, at one point, the government policy had been
that withholding access to lawyers and family members was one of the important and
necessary aspects of detention in terms of the PTS. Detainees often have been held under
the PTA incommunicado , in army camps and, without access to lawyers and relatives, and
in some cases have been tortured and even killed while held in custody (see for example

Amnesty International Annual Report 1984 at p. 258)
29

Weerawansa v. Attorney General (2000) I SLR 387. R.P.A.L Weerawansa, an Assistant
Superintendent of Customs was taken in by the CID on the 30,h of April, 1996, under

S. 6(1) of the PTA. He was detained thereafter up

to

the 2"' May, 1996 under PTA S.

7(1). From 2"d May to 2 00 October of that year, he was detained by ministerial orders
under PTA S. 9(1). Thereafter, he was transferred into the custody of the Customs and
detained from 3,d October to 31>1 December under a magisterial remand order.
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the instance of the CID , which had merely informed the efence M inister
(who was also the Executive President), of their wilfully false and unreasonable
conclusions, thereby misleading her. There had been no ind pendenr exercise
of judgemenr by the Defence Minister.
This is one instance, among othets where the Court used provisions of the
Constitution including the Directive Principles of State Policy ro bring in
provisions of the International Covenant on C ivil and Political Rights (ICCPR,
ro which Sti Lanka is a signarory), when dealing wi th issues f personall ibetty.
Thus, though a person may be taken in under Section 9(1) of the PTA or any
other provision which specifically dispenses with production before a judicial
officet before the making of a detention order, there was an obligation ro
produce such a person after the maki ng of such an order. Such a production
was not merely cosmetic. On the contrary, the judicial officer would then be
able ro make his Ot het own observations about the ill-treatment of the detainee
or the conditions of detention, and so on. In this case, M r. Weerawansa had
not been brought before a judicial officer duting his entire petiod of detention,
thus violating his constitutional rights. 30
While the above decisions had considerab le impact on individual petitioners,
the jurisprudence of the Court did not lead ro a noticeable reini ng in of the
use of emergency powers by government in power. There were several teasons
as ro why this was the case. In the first instance, public interes t litigation
asserting the t ights of detainees was nOt possible with in the restrictive

30

Interestingly, Justice MDH Fernando wriling for the Court. took the view that the later
remand orders by the Magistrate , Harbour Coun made under the ordinary law, was also
in violation of Mr. Wecrawansa's righ ts. Several such o rd ers of remand had been made
even though the M agis trate or lhe acring Magistrate did not visit or communicate w ith
him. This offended a basic consticuc ional safeguard in art. 13(2), at judge and suspect
must be brought face to face before liberty is cu rtailed, which was not an obl igatio n that

could be circumvemed by producing reports from [he police. Jusei ce Fernando agreed
with [he provisions view expressed in Farook v. Raymond (1996) I SLR . 2 17) [hat such
remand orders, where ehey concern a patene wane of jurisdict ion, cannoe be safegua rded
under the cover of being 'judicial aCls' wi th consequenc immuni from fundamental
rights challenge. It was the execurive which had [he cuscody of Mr. Weerawansa fro m 3rd
Occober. 1996, and so his detention was by unlawful execueive or administ rali ve act ion.
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provisions of Sri Lanka's Constitution." . unlike in the Indian constitutional
context . Many of the detainees them selves . once freed from the shackles
of unjustified detention. were reluctant ro push the iss ue further in the
public forum so as ro urge action beyon d individual rel ief. Thus. though
decisions of the Co urt were many. some of which have been highlighted in
this analysis. there was no collective momentum for a concerted push for
legal reform. Ideally. such a campai gn could have positioned constituti onal
and staturory reform as its core objective . having in mind an overall revisio n
of the applicable investigative and prosecurorial struCtures. However. this
was not to be.
In the second instance and. perhaps. more importantly. though the Supreme
Court endeavoured ro restrain state power to the fullest extent possible in
terms of its constitutional powers. it signally failed to address the question of
enforced disappearances. The constitutional omission of the right to life. as
well as the omission of a specific prohibition on disappearances. meant that
family members of the disappeared could nOt directly come before the Court in
fundamental rights litigation. The legal remedy available for these victims was.
rather. to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to Appeal in writ applications of
habeas corpus. In this regard. though there had been some advances made by
the Court where the disappearance of a person in custody was met by a false
denial of such custody by the relevant authority." this remedy had proved to

31

The 1978 Consti tuti on, in the doubtfu l wisdom afits framers, had thought it

fit

to

give

the right [0 relief only {Q a person alleging the infringement of any right 'relating to such
person', with on ly that person or an attorney at law on his behalf being able co petition
court. (art. 126 (2). This is in abrupt cont rast to the Indian Constitution which allows

32

bona fide public inreresr petition to be fi led on behalf of aggrieved persons. thus allowing
the rich spread of public interest litigation by the Indian Supreme Court.
K. Leeda Violet and Others y. Ole. Diekwella Police Statio n. HCA 164/89. CA Minutes
02112/1994 where it was judicially opined that "The Rule of Law. freedom and the safety
of the subject would be completely nullified. if any person in authority can cause the
disappearance of an ind ividual who has been taken into custody and then blandly deny
to this Court having jurisdiction to safeguard the liberty of the subject, any knowl edge
of the whereabouts of such indi vidual. The process of habeas corpus ........ .... ........ ... .
cannot be reduced to a cipher by a person in authority. who yet contin ues to wield
authori ty by falsely denying the arrest and custody of an individual whose freedom the
writ is intended to ensure."
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be largely inefficacious due to the tremendous delay in the fi al determination
of the applications. 33
Noticeably, it took the Supreme Court almost twenty five years . after a justiciable
chapter on fundamental rights was constitutionally incorpo rated in 1978, to
recognise an implied righr to life in the Constitution in the a sence of such an
express right. In twO recent seminal decisions," the Court inferred a positive
right from the negative, as contained in the constitutiona l right not to be
punished with death or imprisonment, except by court order (Art. 13(4)) . It
was reasoned that this constitutional art. means that a person has a right to
live, unless a court orders orherwise.
Thus, in turn, a person has a right to life- at least in the sense of mere
existence as distinct from the quality of life- which he can be deprived of
only under court order. Similarly, art. 11 guarantees freedom from torture
and from cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment. Thus, to unlawfully
deprive a person of life, without his consent or against his will, would
certainly be inhuman treatment, for life is an essential pre-condition for
being human.
From this point, the judges proceeded to hold that the next-of-kin, intestate
heirs or dependants would be able to sue the wrongdoers for the unlawful
death so caused." In this sense, the court recognized at long last the evident

33

As remarked by a tcam of observers from the Imernational Commission of Jurists who
visited Sri Lanka in 1997 habeas corpus applications "take year~" to be disposed of,
regard less of the fact that in most jurisdictions, they are treated as a matter of ucmos(
urgency. The observer tcam poimcd out that a lOughcr atticude should be taken towards
adjournments. Equally, the inquiryJrocess by a co urt of first instance is cited as being a
considerable factor for the delay, an it was recommended that, in appropriate instances,

the Court of Appeal conduct the inquiry itself instead of referring it for enquiry and
report.

34

Perera v. Iddamalgoda (the Ourage Sriyani Silva case) 2003 [2] Sri L R. 63) per judgement
of Justice Mark Fernando and Wewalage Rani Fernando (wife of deceascd Lama Hewage
Lal) and mhersv. Ole, Minor Offences. Seeduwa Police Station, Seeduwa and eight others
SC (FR) No 700/2002, SCM 26107/2004, per judgement of Justice A. Bandaranayake)

35

The liberal judicial interpretarion articulated in the Durage Sriyani Silva case was opined
to be compelled by international obligation and standards, panicularly provisio ns of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatmcnt giving

68

Extraordinary Anguish - The Trampling of Rights Amidst Conflict In Sri Lanka

anomaly in the alternative that gives redress for the lesser infringement
(imprisonment) but not for the greater (death). The word 'person' in art.
126(2)36 was interpreted broadly in the context of the express duty imposed
on the Court by art. 4(d) of the Constitution to respect, secure and advance
fundamental rights, as well as art. 118(b) conferring exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Supreme Court ro protect fundamental rights. In addition,
art. 17 (entitling a person to make an application ro court regarding an
infringement), was reiterated ro be an independent right. Consequently, as
much as any person would be entitled to relief for being temporarily prevented
from exercising this right, similar redress was declared to be given if he was
permanently so prevented.
This judicial expansion was used to good effect in a consequent decision of
the Supreme Court which represented a considerable jurisprudential advance
in acknowledging the right ro life in its relevance to the right not ro be
'disappeared.''' A habeas corpus application had been lodged in the Court
of Appeal by a father who had, along with his two sons, been artested in a
cordon and search operation conducted by the Plantain Point Army camp in
1990. While the father was released thereafter, his sons continued to be kept
in the cusrody of the army camp and thereafter 'disappeared.' The father's
habeas corpus application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the basis
that he has not succeeded in discharging the burden of proof laid on him to
show that the army officer cited in his petition was in fact, responsible for
the arrest and detention of his sons. However, on his appeal therefrom ro the
Supreme Court, leave to appeal was granted on the following grounds; Did
the matter disclose a violation of a fundamental right under art. 13(4) of
the Constitution ("no person shall be punished with death or imprisonment

the right to compensation to dependants in [he event of death of the victim ((0 which
Convention, Sri Lanka is a party)
36

Which constitutional article gives the right to move court only to a person alleging the
infringement of any right 'relating to such person') Of an attorney at law on his behalf

37

Kanipathipillai Machchavallavan v. OIC, Army Camp. Plantain Point, Trincomalee and
Others (SC Appeal No. 9012003. SC (Spl) L.A No. 177/2003. SCM 31.03.2005 , per
judgement of (Dr) Justice Srirance Bandaranayake.
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except by an order of a competent Court"), by a state officer for whose act
the State was liable during the hearing of his application before the Court
of Appeal? Consequently, should the entire matter have been referred to the
Supreme Court for determination under art. 126(3) of [he Constitution?
art. 126(3) mandates that where, in the course of hearing writ applications
in the Court of Appeal, there is a prima facie evidence of a infringement of
a fundamental right, the Court should refer such matter for determination
to the Supreme Court.
In its ruling, the Court, referring to the earlier decisions that had declared an
implied right to life as contained in art. 13(4), held that a referral !Tom the Court
of Appeal to the Supreme Court was constitutionally called for as it was 'beyond
doubt' that there had been an infringement of art. 13(4) of the Constitution by
some state officers at the time thar the Court of Appeal mad,! its order. 38
Another recent decision , this time of the Court of Appeal , related to the
quashing of a circular issued by the DIG , Personal and Trainin g, dated 5'h
January, 2001 , directing all DIGG Ranges, SSPP Divisions (Territo rial and
Functional) to reinstate all officers who have been interdi cted following
the inquiries conducted by Disappearances Investigation Unit (DIU) and
charged in courtS but subsequently bailed out in connection with the causes
of disappearances of persons. The court order was on the basis that the circular
was ultra vires the Establishments Code which stipulated that where legal
ptoceedings are taken against a public officer for a criminal offence or bribery
or corruption, the relevant officer should be forth with Interdicted by the
apptopriate authority."
38

" ...... it is reasonable to conclude that the corpora were kept in the Army Camp with the
knowledge and connivance of the Army Officers. Hence, Army authorities are respo nsible

to accoum for the whereabouts of the [Wo sons ofrhe appellam . ... "ar page 10 of the
judgemem. per Justice ShiranceA. Bandaranayake. Since there wa... howeve r, no evidence
that the first respondent officer was responsibl e for the arrest and dc {cmion o f (he corpora,
the State w as held responsible for the disappearance of the corpora and o rdered ro pay

compensation and COSts. The applicability by the time bar.(yet agai n another of the many
obstacles placed by the framers of the Constitution impeding an effective working of lhe
rights chapter) to the instant case was dism issed by court.
39

Pathirana v. DIG (Personnel &Training) and others, CA. Writ Application N 1123/2002,
CA. Minutes 09.10.2006 per judgement ofJustice S Sriskandarajah. Some of these police
officers had filed fundamental rights applicable as well as the petition in the National
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Again however, the deterrent impact of decisions of this nature (as
undoubtedly commendable as they are) were limited. Ironically, the failure
of constitutional guarantees and judicial interventions had become most
apparent during those rare intervals when there was a cessation of hostilities
and the emergency had been allowed to lapse. During these intermittent
periods, brutal practices of arrest, detention and interrogation resorted to
by the police, particularly in respect of petty criminal offenders and persons
mistakenly suspected of crime, and endemic practices of torture prevalent
in that regard, has been well documented." Clearly, the shadow cast by the
unlimited powers allowed under the emergency for many years was long
enough to encompass custodial abuse, even during a time when the normal
law was in force. This had been repeatedly of concern to international treaty
monitoring mechanisms. 41
Despite the Court ordering prohibitive compensation and costs in hundreds of
fundamental rights applications against officers with custodial authority, and in
many cases, directing that the case be referred to the disciplinary authorities for
suitable action, no action was, in fact, taken, indicating a manifest contempt
for the Court." Official resistance to these decisions was so high that the police
department set up funds to provide for lawyers to appear for the respondent
police officers," as well as in some cases, to pay sums of compensation due
personally from the implicated officers.

Human Rights Commission stating that they had been kept in interdiction unfairly for
over 10 years . However, these applications had been withdrawn and the Supreme Court
had consequently dismissed the said applications.

40

"The number of credible complaints of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment whilst in police custody shows no decline." Per observation of Justice Mark

Fernando in Sanjecwa v. Suraweera, 2003 [IJ SLR31 7
41

See respectively Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on Sr i Lanka
in 1998 and 2005, (UN Doc. N53/44, paragraphs 243-257, 19 May 1998, CATICI
LKAlCO/I/CRP2.7-25 November 2005)and concluding observation No.9 of the UN
Human righ ts Committee (CCPRlC0I79/LKA) Human Rights Committee, seventy

42

Ibid.

43

In part due to the Attorney General's Department declining to appear for the respondent
officers.

ninth session.
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By the early 2000s, activist focus on constitutional rig hts had become
increasingly linked to a critical examination of the criminal law and the
acknowledgement that inAexible penal consequences ma y result in greater
deterrent impact than judicial pronou ncements in terms of the Constitution.
It had become clear that constitutional reform, by itself, was not sufficient if
justice was to be meted out to the "disappeared. "

SRI LANKA'S OBLIGATIONS IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
STANDARDS AND THE CRIME OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES
International Law Standards
"Enforced disappearances" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation ofliberry by agents of the State or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the depri vation ofl iberry or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
places such a person outside the protection of the law"
The comparative definition in the Rome Stature has an additional element in
that it applies to the acts of a political organisation as well a; that of the State'S
44

AI(. 2 of the Internati onal Convention for th e Protection of all pe rso ns against Enforced
Disappearances , adopted on 29 June, 2006. The Convention reAected imcrnationallaw in

this regard. See the assertion that enforced disappearances "constitutcs an offence to human
dignity, a grave and flagrant violation o f human rights and fun damental freedorns[ ... }
and a violation of the ru les of international law" in Resolmion 119/ 193 of the General

Assembly, adopted 23 December, 1994 , and also resolutions 51/94 of 12 December,
1996, and 531150 of9 December, 1998. See art. I, paragraph 2 "fthe UN Declaration
on the Protection of AU Persons from Enforced Disappearances, S.A. res. 47/ 133, 47
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. N47/49 (1992) . Adopted by General
Assembly resoluti on 47/133 of 18 December, 1992 (hereafter the Declara tion) and in
particular, the Imer- American Court of Human Rights, decision dated 14 March, 2001 ,
in {he Case o f Barrios AltOS (Chumbipuma Aguirre and Others v Peru) paragraph 41.
45

"Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention o r abduction of persons
by, or with the aurhori7..3.cion, suppOrt or acquiesce of a State o r political organization .
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation offreedom or to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of those persons with (he imention o f removing them from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.' art. 7, paragraph 2(i) of the
Rome Statute of (he International Criminal Court (hereafter the orne Statuce). Text of
the Rome Statute circulated as document NCONF. 183/9 of 17 Jllly 1998 and corrected
by proqess-verbaux of 10 November, 1998. 12 July, 1999, 30 Nove mber, 1999 , 8 May,
2000, 17january, 2001, and 16 January, 2002. The Statute enten,d into force on 1 Jul y,
2002.
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Commenting on this departure, the Working Group (WG) on Disappearances
has established that, for purposes of its work, enforced disappearances are only
considered as such when the act in question is perpetrated by state actors or
by private individuals or organized groups (e.g. paramilitary groups) action
on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence
of the Government.'6

In so far as Sri Lanka is concerned, the accession to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)47 has meant that the prohibition imposed
by this treary against enforced disappearances applies directly to state obligations
in international law. Enforced disappearances represents a clear breach of
various provisions of the Covenant, including the right to liberry and security
of person (art. 9), the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7), and the right of all persons
deprived of their Ii berry to be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person (art. 10). It also violates or constitutes a
grave threat to the right to life (art. 6) 48 According to the jurisprudence of the
Committee and that of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, the State
party has a responsibility to investigate the disappearance in a thorough and
effective manner, to bring to justice those responsible for disappearances, and
to provide compensation for the victims' families ' 9 In one Communication of
46

See General Comment of the WG

47

Sri Lanka acceded [0 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (referred to
hereafter as the Covenant or ICCPR) on 11 June 1980 (entry into force on 11 September

1980) and the Fitst Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on 3 Ocrober 1997 (entry into
force on 3 January 1998).
48

Celis Laureano v. Peru, Case No. 54011993. Views adopted on 25 March 1996. Also,
Bleier Lewhoff and Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay Case No. 30/1978 Views adopted on
29 March 1982 and the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights CommittccBurundi, of 3 August 1994 (United Nations document CCPRlCI79/Add.41 .par.9).

49

Sanjuan Arevalo y. Colombia, Case No. 181/1984. Views adopted on 3 November
1989; Avellanal v. Peru, Case No. 202 / 1986 views adopted on 28 October 1988;
Mabaka Nsusu v. Congo, Case No. 157/1983, Views adopted on March 26, 1986; and
Vicente et al. v. Colombia, Case No. 612/ 1995, Views adopted on 29 July 1997; sec also
General Comment No.6, HRI /GEN/1/Rev.1 (! 994), patagraph 6. Sec also, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the third periodic repon of Senegal, 28
December 1992, CCPRlCI79/Add.1 0; sec laso Baboeram v. Surinam, case No. 146/ 1983,
Views adopted on 4 April 1985 and Hugo Dermit v. Uruguay, Case No. 84/1981, Views
adopted on 21 October 1982.
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Views against the Sri Lankan State,50 the principle that the army is indisputably
an organ of that State and an enforced disappearances al the hands of any
member of the army is imputable to the State party was affirmed by the
Committee in no uncertain terms. S1 The petitioner argued that the State party
had failed to investigate effectively its responsibility as we ll as the individual
responsibility of those suspected of the direct commission of the offences. It
had given no explanation as to why an investigation was commenced some ten
years after the disappearance was first brought to the attem ion of the relevant
authorities. Moreover, the investigation did not ptovide information of orders
that may have been given to the low-ranking officers regarding their role in
search operations, nor did it consider the chain of command.

It has not provided information about the systems in place within the militaty
concerning orders, training, reporting procedures or other process to monitor
the activity of soldiers which may support or undermine the claim that the
superior officers did not order and were not aware of the activities of their
subordinates. It was alleged that there were striking omissions in the evidence

50

The Human Rights Committee has, up to date, delivered six Communication ofYiews
against the Sri Lankan State, namely Fernando v. Sri Lanka Case N o . 189/2003. Adoption
of Views on 31, March 2005), Sarma v. Sri Lanka No. 950/ 2000. Adoption of Views
on 31 July 2003, Jayawardene v. Sri Lanka, Case No. 91612000. Adoption of Views on
26 July 2002, Iyan v. Sri Lanka, Case No. 909 /2000. Adoption of Views on 26 August,
Sinhanrasa v. Sri Lanka, Case No. 1033/2004 Adoption of Views on 23 August 2004
and Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka Case No. 1250/2004 , Adoption of Views on July 26,2006.
However, there has been no implementation of these Views by (he Sri Lankan G overnment.

A recent decision by (he Supreme Court (SCM 15.9.2006, judg.ement of Chief Justice
Sarath Silva) on a review petition filed in respect of the Sinharaia case, ruling that the
presidential act of accession to the Prorocol to the ICCPR (which t:nabled the Committee
to receive and consider individual communications from any individual subject to Sri
Lanka's jurisdiction) was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power as well as an
equally unconstitutional confermcnt of judicial power on the Committee, has proved to
be extremely inimical to the domestic impact of the Committee's decisions. T his decision
of the Court has been subjected to severe criticism on the basis that it reduces rights of
the individual in favour of an obsolete notion of state sovereign ty.

51

Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Case No. 95012000, Views adopted on 31 July 2003, approving of the
Velasquez Rodriguez case (1989), Inter- American Court of Human Rights. Judgement
of29 July 1998, (Ser.C) No.4 (1988). The case concerned a complaint filed by a father
from Trincomalee, whose son had disappeared in army custody ill 1990, the facts before
{he Committce was dcclarcd to disclose a violation of art. 7 an 9 of th e [CCPR with
regard to {he petitioner's son and art. 7 of the ICC PR with regard to {he petitioner and
his wife.
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gathered by me State parry. Thus. the records of the ongoing military operations
in mis area in 1990 had not been accessed or produced. and no detention records
or information relating to the cordon and search operation were adduced. Even
though indictment was filed against the junior army officer found responsible.
key individuals were not included as witnesses for the prosecution. despite the
fact that they had already provided statements to the authorities and could
have provided testimony crucial to the case.
In counter. me government contended mar this disappearance was an isolated
act, initiated solely by a minor officer without the knowledge or compliciry of
other levels within the military chain of command. This was a position that
was rejected by me Committee." Further, it was opined that it is implicit in
art. 4(2) of the Optical Protocol that "the State parry has the dury to investigate
in good faith all allegations of violation of the Covenant made against it and
its authorities."" The State parry was directed to expedite current criminal
proceedings against individuals implicated in the disappearance and to ensure
the prompt trial of all persons responsible for the abduction. It was also put
under an obligation to provide the victims with an effective remedy, including
a thorough and effective investigation into his disappearances and fate, his
immediate release if he is still alive, adequate information resulting from its
52

Where the violation of Covenant rights is carried out by a soldier or other official who
uses his or her position of authoriry to execute a wrongful act, the violation is impUlablc
to the State, (Sec Caballero Delgado and Santa na Case, Inter- American Coun of
Human Rights. Judgement of8 December 1995 (Annual Report of the Intcr- American

Court of Human Rights 1995 OAS/Ser.UV 111.33 Doc 4); Garrido and Baigorria case.
Judgement on the merits. 2 February 1996. il1lCf- American Court of Human Rights)
even where the soldier or the other official is acting beyond his authority, if it provided
the means o r facilities {Q accomplish (he act. Even if, and this is not known in this case,
the officials acted in direct comravemion of the orders given to them , the State may sti ll
be responsible. Timunas v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights, Application no.
23531/94, Judgement of 13 June 2000; Enak v. Turkey, European Coun of Hum an

53

Rughts. Application no. 207645/92, Judgement of9 May 2000.
Bleier v. Uruguay. Case No. 30/1978. adopled on 24 March 1980. paragraph 13.3. In
regard ro the cominuing nature of the act) it was pointed out in Sarma that enforced
disappearances "shall be considered a continuing offence as long as the perpeuawrs
continue to conceal the fate and whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and
these faces remain unclarined" art. 3 of the Illler- American Convemion on the Forced
Disappearances of Persons which states that the offence of forced disappearance "shall
be deemed cominuous or permanent, as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim
has not been determined" was also referred to.
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investigation and adequa te compensation for the violations suffered by him
and his famil y.
An interesting part of the Committee's decision was the reite ration of an earlier

held view that the enforced disappearance in issue amounted to a violation
of art. 7, ICCPR, namely the right to freedom from torture or fro m cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 54
In addition, the violation of art. 7 of the Covenant in respect of the parents
themselves cen tred on the 'anguish and stress' that they had suffered as a result
of his disappearances and the continuing uncertainty concerning his fate and
whereabouts. 55 Concerns have also been expressed, in the treat:y-based periodical
repo rting procedures , regarding the inability of the Sri Lankan State to identifY
and/or inaction in identifYing the perpetrators responsible for the large numbers
of enforced or involuntaty disappearances of persons. Taken togethe r with the
reluctance of victims to file or pursue complaints, this was observed 'to creare
an environment that is conductive to a culture of impunity >56

THE CRIME OF ENFORCED
INTERNATIONAL LAW

DISAPPEARAN C ES

IN

Art. 4(1) "All acts of enforced disappearance shall be offences unde r criminal
law punishable by appropriate penalties which shall take into account their
extreme seriousness. "57

54

Quinteros v. Uruguay. Case No. 107/1981. Views adopted on 21 July 1983 .

55

Ibid. In Quinteros, the Commince cons idered th at the fam ily memhers of the disappeared
were also victims of a11 the violations suffered by (he disappeared, including an. 7.

56 In Concl uding Observation No. 10 of the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPRlCO/79/
LKA) Human Rights Committee, seventy ninth session , Novembe r 2003. Though the
Committee directed that Sri Lanka should respond on this particular question wgether
with three Other questions to be of overriding impo rtance withi ll one year namely by
October- Nove mber 2004, there has been no perceptible adherence by the gove rnment
to this directio n. In this same context, see also Committee Against Torture, Co ncluding

Observations on Sri Lanka in 2005. (CAT/ LKAIC0/1/CRI'2.7-25 November 2005) at
paragraph 12.
57

UN Declaratio n on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, GA. res.

47/133.47 U.N. GAORSupp. (No. 49) at 207. U.N. Doc.N47/49 (1992). Adopted by
General Assembly resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992 (hereafter the Declaration).
The UN General Assembly, in adopting the Declaration emphasized the importance of
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In its General Commemary on An. 4 of rhe Declaration," the Working Group
on Enforced or Involumary Disappearances (WG) has stated that, although
States are not bound to fo llow the definition comained in the Declaration
strictly in their criminal codes, they shall ensure that the act of enforced
disappearances is defined in a way that clearly distinguishes it from related
offences such as abduction and kidnapping.
A funher poim ofimerest made by the WG is under the definition of'enforced
disappearances' contained in the Declaration: the criminal offence in question
starts with an arrest, detemion or abducrion against the will of the victim, which
means rhat the enforced disappearance may be initiated by an illegal detention or
by an initially legal arrcst or detention. That is to say, the protection of a victim
from enforced disappearance must be effective upon the act of deprivation of
liberty, whatever form such deprivation of liberty takes, and not be limited
to cases of illegitimate deprivations of liberty. The emphasis on the need for
disappearance to be recognised as a crime is reflected in other imernational
instruments as well. S9

devising "an instrument which characrcri1.cd all acts of enforced disappearances of perso ns
as very serious offences and sets fonh standards designed to punish and prevent their
commiss ion." Resolution 47/133 of 18 Decem ber 1992. Also of imcres( are Reso lution

49/1993 of23 December 1994) Resolution 51194 of 12 December 1996 and ResolU[ion
53/ 1SO of9 December 1998 which emphasized {hat enforced disappearances is a crime
that attracts crimina l sanction.

58

See UN. Doc EI CN.411996/38, paragraph 54

to

58 as well as the new General

Commentary issued by the WG on the definition of en forced disappearances (M arch

2007)
59

See art. III (I) "The Srares Panics undertake to adopt, in accordance with thei r consll[Utional
procedures, rhe legislative measures that may be needed {Q define rh e forced disappearance
of persons as an offence and {Q impose an appropriate punishment comme nsu rat e with
its extreme gravity. This offence shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as
the fate or whereabouts of the victim has nor been dctermined." Art. IV (I) "The acts
consri [utin~ the forced disappea rances of persons shall be considered offenses in every
Slare Party' (The Imer-American Convemion on Forced Disappearances of Persons).
See also the obscrvation of th e Human Rights Committee in Concluding Observations-

Honduras" UN Doc CCPRlC/ HND/COIl of December 13,2006. paragraph 5 "The
State parry sho uld amend the Criminal Code in order {Q include the crime of enforced
disappearances. It should also ensure th at the cases of enforced disappearances are duly
investigated, that rhose responsible are prosecuted and , where appropriare, punished and
that the victims or their relatives receive fa ir and adequate co mpensa tion."
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ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE ABSENCE OF
THE 'CRIME' OF DISAPPEARANCES IN SRI LANKAN LAW AND
RELEVANT PROSECUTORlAL PROCESSES.
A notable feature in the criminal process had been the convoluted and often
tortuous recourse to ordinary penal provisions relating to the many cases of
disappearances in the absence of a specific 'crime' of disappearances.GO
In this regard, the Sri Lankan criminal law is a first offender of the international
law principle en un ciated in the preceding analysis; namely that the act of
en forced disappearance must be criminally defi ned in such a way that is clearly
distinguishable from related offences such as abduction and kidnapping. [n
the recent decades of mass killings, enfo rced disappearances and violation of
physical life and liberties, only two major criminal prosecutions have been
successfully brought to a close at the original and appellate process, namely in
the Embilipitiy Case and the Krishnathi Kumaraswamy Case. T his startling
statistic, by itself, confirms the failure of the criminal law, the prosecutorial
process and, in deed, the judicial system in the country.
Notably however, the question of accountab iliry in terms of the criminal law
extends beyond the mere absence of a legal definition in the Matute. Even where
a statute has been relatively sophisticated in its substance, such as the Torture
Act, its actual impact upon society has been minimal due to poor prosecutorial
processes and the lack of political will to being about subst ntive changes. For
example, thought the Torture Act became part of Sri Lanka's law in 1994, not
a single co nvictio n was evidenced in terms of this Act for ten years thereafter.

60

Provisions of the Penal Code under which perso ns may be punished for transgress ions of
phys ical security and persona liberty. Include fo r example, culpahle hom ici de (5. 293),
mu rder (s. 294) , death by negligence (s. 298), attempt to murder (s. 300), attempt to
commi t cu lpable homicide (5.301). hun to extort confession (5. 312), wrongful restrain[
(5.330), wrongful co nfi nement (s. 331,334,335), and criminal foro: and assault (s. 340-9).
Provisions com monly utilised in cases of enforced disappearances arc 355 (kidnapping or
abduction in orde r to murder), 356. (kidnapping or abd uction with intent to cause that
person to be secretl y and wrongfully confined), 335 (wrong co nfinement), 32 (common
intention) and conspiracy (s. 11 3 (B) and abetment (s. 102). s. 82 of the Police Ordi nance
makes it an offence for a police officer to knowingly and wilfully exceed his powe r or to
offe r an y unwarramable personal violence to any person in custody.
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From 2005 , there were only rwo convicrion; undeniably not a success rate that
prosecurors could be proud of Defensive reasons have been advanced in this
regard, including the perennial problem of the absence of a comprehensive
witness protection scheme resulting in witnesses dropping out of protracted
trials due to intimidation by the perpetrators, unsympathetic trial processes and
even an argument that the harsh imposition of a minimum sentence of seven
years has made judges reluctant to convict. However, the truth is that these
arguments only illustrate the essential weakness of the system and, consequently,
the failure of the State to remedy these lacunae and put into place a working
and efficacious trial process.
The above reasoning goes to rhe argument sought ro be made out in this paper
thar the failure of Sri Lanka's prosecutorial and legal processes cannot be limited
ro extraordinary crimes during times of emergency; rather, they manifest a
pervasive problem with inadequate legal mechanisms that are in force in times
of peace as well as (obviously, in a more aggravated manner) in times of war.
Questions ofInvestigative and Prosecutorial Capacity
Procedures currently in place for commencing investigations into serious human
rights violations are grossly inefficient. Instances of forced disappearances are
investigated by the Disappearances Investigation Unit (DIU), a special unit
within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the police force.
However, since it is predominantly members of the police and security forces
who are held responsible for disappearances, investigation by the DIU does
not amount to investigation by a competent and independent State authority.
Investigative responsibility in regard to general human rights violations that are
of a grave nature are handled by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) which is
understaffed and under- resou rced. 61 In addition, its officers are nOt permanently
attached to the SIU and may be transferred out at any moment. This results in
a problematic situation where a police officer presently attached to the SIU, and
61

When a case is referred to the SIU, a tcam of abom three policemen is required to visit

the area in which the alleged offence occurred and begin their invesrigation. According
to current procedure, it is irnpera .. ive that at least the initial complaint is recorded by
an Assistant Superintendent of Police (AS P). But as there arc a limited number of ASPs
attached to the Unit, there is a considerable delay before proper investigations begin.
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who conducts an investigation against a colleague at police statio n "X", may
very well find himself subsequently transferred to "X" to wo rk alongside the
sa id officer. This may result in the SIU officer being ostracized at his new POSt
and may even endanger his life and job at the hands of an angry and vengeful
colleague. Hence, not having a permanen t team of officers anached to the SIU
is a distinct disadvantage that impedes upon the efficiency and dil igence with
which the SIU carries Out investigations.
Consequent to investigations, prosecutorial responsibility lies with the Missing
Persons' Unit (MPU) which is a sepatate unit within the Attorney General's
department, headed by a D eputy Solicitor General with a team of junior state
officers working under him/her. The functioning of this Un it depends heavily
o n the investigations by the DIU, which, as stated earlier, is not an independent
inves tigative body. Such indictments, if filed, are only against junior officers ."
The MPU appears to choose only cases where there is direct evidence of removal
or disappearances and does not look into the large numbers of cases with strong
circumstantial evidence. Victims removed involuntarily, detained and tortured,
and subsequently released or escaped have often been eyewirnesses to many
atrocities in police stations and army detention centres, but their information
has not been utilized. The MPU has a poor record of successful prosecutions
in cases of forced disappearance, despite the fact that tens of thousands of such
cases are documented to have occurred in the past. Since 1998, up to available
data in 2004, it had secured convictions in only nine cases of disappearance.

Victims Concerns
A broader vision of the role of prosecution ptocesses in meeting victim needs for
information and reparation, as well as specific avenues fot victim participation in
trial processes, is undoubtedly needed. A revised trial process i Sri Lanka should
give the victims the right to initiate investigations and necessary info rmation
and invoke the jurisdiction of the COUrt. They should have the right of access
62

One reason for this is that the Disappearances Investigation Unit within the Police
Depart ment simply does nor rerum files relating to senior offi cers (Q [he prosecutors,
claiming that its invcstigations are not complete. The missing Persons Unit of the Anorney
General's Department is then hel pless [0 expedite action in those ClSCS.
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all documents and necessary information including legal documentation at
any stage of the trial. Where requested, the trauma of facing in open courtthe
very persons accused of causing immeasurable agony to themselves and their
loved ones should be minimized.
to

Intimidation of witnesses is not an isolated practice resorted to only on the part
of the armed forces during times of emergency. Instead, it is a common practice
among law enforcement agencies and is manifested even in normal times, because
police officers accused of torture are kept in their positions despite indictment
and , thus,are afforded an opportunity to threaten and even kill witnesses.
In Sanjeewa vs. Suraweera63 fot example, an employee of the Ceylon dockyard
who was arrested by the police mistakenly believing him to be a criminal, was
then beaten so badly that he suffeted renal failure. His fundamental tights were
later declared to be violated by the Supreme Court. However, no disciplinary
action was taken against the responsible police officers who continued serving in
their POSts. A year latet, as he was due to testifY in the case, instituted in the High
Court in terms of the Torture Act, against the police officers who had tOrtured
him, he was shot and killed at point blank range by some of those very same
police officers. The murder trial is ongoing. This is another facet of the continuing
argument made in this paper that the basic environment for the committing of
grave human rights violations is not limited

to

times of emergency.

In 2004, the decision taken by the National Police Commission (then
functioning constitUtionally) to interdict police officers indicted under the
1994 Anti-Torture Act was one of the most positive steps taken by this body.
However, with the deterioration of the legitimacy of this body in its second
term with its members being unconstitutionally appointed, it is uncertain as
to whether this practice of intetdicting officers indicted of torture is being
continued. This again illustrates the link between impunity and the general
breakdown of the rule of law and constitutional mechanisms.
A witness protection system is meanwhile a most dire need .
63

2003 [1] SLR. 317
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The authorities should diligently enquire into all cases of susp"cted intimidation
of witnesses and establish a witness protection program in order to put an end to
the climate offear that plagues the investigation and prosecution of such cases M
Such a witness protection scheme should address not only immediate security
needs bur also long-term prorection, trauma counselling and psychological
suppOrt, particularly for sexually abused victims. Use of technical means to
safeguard identity, such as video conferencing and in camera proceedings,
shou ld be incorporated.

REFORM OF THE LAW AND LEGAUPROSECUTORIAL PROCESSES
The Constitution and the Rule of Law
A:; pointed out previously, the credibility of public oversight bodies in Sri

Lanka

such as the NHRC and the NPC must be restored . Currently, the level of public
fa ith in their capacity to work independently from government is limited. A
recent decision of the current members of the N HRC to stop inquiring into the
complaints of over 2,000 disappearances of persons which took place in past years
is a case in point. The NHRC pur forward a completely unacceptable reason for
stopping their inquiries "for the time being, unless special directions are received
from the government." A verbatim citation from a note of tlle Secretary to the
Human Rights Commission dated 29 June, 2006, attributed chis to the fact that
"the findings will result in payment of compensation, etc." After intense public
criticism, the NHRC retracted to some measute on this position, but the efficacy
of these investigations remain highly contested. Recently the NHRC has been
64

Concluding Observation No 9 of the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPRlCOI791
LKA) Human Rights Committee. seventy-ninth session, November 2003 . This need
was recognized by then Anomey General of Sri Lanka Mr. K.C Kamlasabayson. who
made the following observation in an address of December 2, 2003: "Another important
feature that requires consideration is the need for an efficient wjtn t~ protection scheme
that would ensure that witness are not intimidated and threatened. No doubt this
would involve heavy expenses for the State and amendments lO [he law, I will only pose
a simple question, Is it more important in a civilized society to uild roads to match
with international standards spending literally millions of dollars , rather than to have a
peaceful and law abiding society where the rule oflaw prevails?" in remarks made during
{he 13 U, Kanchana Abhyapala Memorial lecture as reported by/if" The Right [Q Speak

Loudly (As ian Legal Resource Centre, 2004).
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downgraded in its status from category ''A'' ro category "B" by the International
Coordinating Committee (ICC) of National Human Rights Institutions, UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
In regard ro specific constitutional reform, there is no doubt that the right ro
life and the prohibition against extra judicial killings/enforced disappearance
should be reRected in the constitutional document. Currently, as discussed
in this paper, the Constitution does not include the right to life as a specific
fundamental right, though in some isolated and limited cases, the Supreme
Court has brought in an implied right to life.
Sri Lanka should be urged to ratify the Convention agall1st Enforced
Disappearances, as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against
Torture, and should be further urged to give domestic effect to the ratification
of international conventions and their supervisory mechanisms, particularly
the individual communication procedures.
Reform of the Criminal Law
The creation of the crime of disappearances is imperative in this respect. The
statutory offence should also incorporate interalia, the doctrine of command
responsibiliry and the impermissibility of the defence of superior orders. The
full scope ofliabiliry for prosecution should apply. Statutes oflimitations should
nor apply to the offence of enforced disappearances .
Reform of the Emergency Laws
Reform of the PSO and the PTA in order to ensure personal liberties is necessary.
Provisions relating to the placing of the burden for proving the voluntariness
of a confession upon the detainee, incommunicado detention and the taking
away judicial discretion to grant bail should be repealed/a mended.
Reform of the Prosecutorial and Investigative Processes
Sri Lanka should ensure the establishment of the office of an independent
Prosecutor (appointed by consensus of the government as well as civil society

Vol. 11

National Law School Journal

20 13

organisarions in the country) who would have specially t rained staff under
his/her command to inquire, investigate and prosecute grave rights violations.
Victims' concerns such as the right to initiate an investigation and the right of
inclusion at all stages of the trial process should be specifically integrated into
the trial process. A Witness Protection system handled by competent officers
with security of tenure and completely independent from the normal police
Structure is crucial in this context

CONCLUSION
As this paper makes clear, deterioration of rule oflaw srandards, in cl uding the
independence of the judiciary, and scant respect for constitutional governance
has framed Sri Lanka's slippery rush along the Gadarene slope to a barely
functional state. Poor prosecutorial and investigative capacity to add ress grave
human rights violations have resulted in patterns of scatte red in d ividualised
prosecutions that have failed to challenge an institutiollalised culture of
impunity. Intermittent judicial efforts to advance the boundaries of the law
using standards of international human rights and humanitarian law have had
little or no impact.
The failure of the Sri Lankan State in this regard should he recogn ized as a
failure in respect of all its citizens, Sinhala, Tamil and Muslims. As seen in this
analysis, the brutality of the State has not been limited to those of a particular
ethnicity alone. Instead, though the ethnic factor has lent a specific d imension
to human rights abuses committed during the conflict in the North/East,
victims in all parts of the COUntty still wait for redress. This is a basic fact that
needs to be acknowledged in irs proper context.
Crucially, the independence of public institutions and restoration of public
respect for the independence of the judiciaty and implememation of the rule
oflaw in process of governance remains at the centre of an)' reform processes
in regard to enforcement of legal accountability on the part of the Sri Lankan
State. It is only once respect for the Constitution is restored that one can even
begin to think of reforming the law and prosecutorial policies in regard to
enforced disappearances and other grave human rights violations.

